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UNIVERSITIES, STUDENT-ATHLETES, AND SPORTS
AGENTS: IT IS TIME FOR CHANGE
ED GARVEY*
AND FRANK

I.

J. REMINGTON**

INTRODUCTION

Both authors of this essay are graduates of the University of
Wisconsin Law School. Both have been heavily involved in athletics; Ed Garvey primarily in professional athletics, Frank Remington primarily in intercollegiate athletics. Both of us came to the
same conclusion about the interplay among universities, studentathletes, and sports agents from our different perspectives-that
universities have treated their student-athletes well while they are
eligible to play for the college, but have quickly lost interest in
them once eligibility has been completed.
There are two very worrisome consequences of this neglect.
First, many student-athletes fail to graduate from the university
and, as a result, leave the university with nothing upon which to
build their future. Second, those student-athletes who have the
ability to participate in athletics at the professional level are too
often exploited by the incompetent and unscrupulous agent, and
the athletes often end their professional careers with nothing to
show for their years at the university-no money and no degree.
Our proposals to alter these outcomes are relatively simple,
but profoundly important to the individual student-athlete and to
those universities that have a genuine interest in the welfare of
their student-athletes. What needs to be done is outlined below.
First, universities should not just be allowed, but rather
required by NCAA rules to financially assist student-athletes to
graduate, so long as the student-athlete follows the advice of an
academic counselor and is making progress toward a degree.
Second, NCAA rules should be changed to allow the freshman
student-athlete to disclose to the university an existing precollege
agreement with an agent. The student-athlete should be granted
immunity for participating in the precollege agreement. The
* President, Sports Seminars, Inc.; B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1961; J.D., University
of Wisconsin, 1969; Executive Director, National Football League Players Association,
1971-83.
** Jackson Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; B.S., University of Wisconsin,
1947; LL.B., University of Wisconsin, 1949; Chairman, NCAA Committee on Infractions,
1983-87.
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agreement, which would presently be illegal under the law of
most states, should be voided, and the student-athlete should be
allowed to participate in college sports, without being required to
lie and conceal the truth in order to compete.
Third, universities, at least at the Division I level in football,
basketball, baseball, and ice hockey, should be required to offer an
educational program to student-athletes. This program needs to
equip the student-athlete with the knowledge necessary to enable
the student to make an informed decision about a postcollege
career, including the knowledge necessary to avoid incompetent,
unscrupulous agents.
Fourth, there needs to be developed a group of competent
professionals--lawyers, accountants and financial consultantswho have the necessary knowledge, a commitment to proper professional standards, and the willingness to offer student-athletes
competent representation at a reasonable cost.
Fifth, ways need to be created to bring together on campus, in
an open and above board manner, the student-athletes who need
help and the representatives whose professional commitment is to
serve the interests of the student-athlete.
These objectives seem, on their face, to be simple and achievable. Yet, today universities are prohibited by NCAA rules from
giving financial assistance to former student-athletes who need
help to graduate; universities make no effort to determine
whether a freshman student-athlete already has an agent, because
discovering the facts will make the student-athlete ineligible; and
universities appear not to care that student-athletes are frequently
defrauded by unscrupulous agents, because the student-athletes
lack the knowledge and assistance necessary to avoid those agents.
Each of these five proposals warrants further discussion.
Emphasis should be given at this point to the fact that the NCAA is
made up of most of the colleges and universities in this country. If
the colleges and universities really want to change the rules, they
can be changed. If there is a failure to do so, the fault is attributable to the universities who make up the NCAA.
II.

ASSISTING STUDENT-ATHLETES TO GRADUATE

In the past, NCAA rules have prohibited financial assistance to
athletes after eligibility was completed, even though student-athletes were often programmed by the academic counselor so that it
was impossible for them to graduate in four or even five years.
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Even today the somewhat liberalized NCAA rules allow athletic
financial assistance for only a total of five years.1
Why should NCAA rules prohibit a university from assisting its
student-athletes in obtaining a degree? During Frank Remington's tenure as Wisconsin's faculty representative, the rule limiting
the period in which athletic aid could be given was violated
numerous times at the University of Wisconsin, with his approval.
In every instance, it was on the recommendation of the academic
counselor, and there was a report made to the Big Ten Conference
with the explanation that the sole objective was to assist the former student-athlete in obtaining a degree. There was no exploitation of the practice in order to obtain a recruiting advantage. The
Big Ten faculty representatives, to their credit, listened to the
report of the violation and took no action, for the reason that no
one wanted to impose a penalty for aiding a deserving former student-athlete in obtaining a degree. Yet, a decade or two later, the
NCAA rule still provides that athletic aid can be given only
"[w]ithin six years after initial enrollment... (provided the student does not receive such aid for more than five years during that
period) .... ."I
There are indications that some people recognize the problem and are beginning to take the steps necessary to enable the
student-athlete to graduate. But most of these efforts originate
outside the universities, and are, on occasion, even opposed by the
universities. This is true, for example, Congress' proposal to
require universities to publish the graduation rate of student-athletes.3 This proposal was made with the hope that the publicity
will pressure the universities into assisting student-athletes in
graduating. 4
There are also important efforts by individuals to assist student-athletes to graduate. Arthur Ashe, the former tennis great,
recently announced the formation of an organization designed to
help student-athletes graduate and get nonsports jobs.5 North
Carolina basketball coach, Les Robinson, has entered into a shoe
contract and plans to donate at least $50,000, which will be used to
help former players graduate.6 Northeastern University also has a
1. NCAA BYLAW art. 15.01.5, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
MANUAL 1991-92, at 157 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
2. Id.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a) (1965), amended by 20 U.S.C. § 1092(aXK) (1990).
4. Student Right-To-Know Act, Pub L. No. 101-542, § 102, 104 Stat. 2381, 2381 (1990).
5. Lederman, Athletic Notes, Chron. Higher Ed., Sept. 26, 1990, at A48.
6. CFA SIDELINES, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Oct. 1990).
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program to assist student-athletes, including those from other
schools, to graduate. This program uses "pay for work" as a way to
get around the NCAA rule prohibiting athletic aid for more than
five years.
Contributions of dedicated individuals like Arthur Ashe and
Les Robinson are commendable, but what have universities (other
than Northeastern University) and the NCAA done? Much too little. Why not an NCAA rule that provides that universities shall
continue to aid the student-athlete financially for so long as the
student-athlete follows the advice of the academic counselor and is
making "satisfactory progress toward a degree"?
III.

HELPING THE STUDENT-ATHLETE AVOID BEING
CORRUPTED BY THE INCOMPETENT AND
UNSCRUPULOUS AGENT
A.

PAST PRACTICES ENGAGED IN BY SPORTS AGENTS

Many university conference officials and NCAA staff understate the problem of agents on and around the campus. Yet,
agents have had a corrupting influence on coaches, athletic
department personnel, and athletes. Coaches are willing to ban
National Football League (NFL) or National Hockey League
(NHL) scouts from practice in retaliation for the underclass draft,
while ignoring the real culprit-the agent who urges the athlete to
join the professional rank as a sophomore or junior. Other wellmeaning coaches hope that local attorneys or alumni will, when
the time is right, help the athlete. The sad fact is that it is always
too late by the time the ethical attorney or helpful alumnus steps
in to help. By that time, the agent has the athlete's name on the
dotted line.
The nature and extent of the agent problem can be illustrated
by using the National Football League experience as an example.
Prior to 1961, athletes in the NFL were not permitted to have anyone accompany them in contract negotiations with the NFL
teams. In many, if not most cases, the head coach was also the
general manager. The significance of that should be obvious. A
young man just out of college, hoping to make an NFL team, knew
he had to please the coach-convince him that he had what it
takes to become an NFL player. His first meeting with the coach
was a negotiating session over his contract. The coach said, "Listen, young man, you might make this team, but attitude is important. I don't want any hassles over your contract, because I want
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you on the field tomorrow." The player typically signed whatever
the coach put in front of him.
In 1961, a new league came into existence' when a group of
investors, tired of waiting for an NFL franchise, formed the American Football League (AFL). With two leagues bidding for players,
the teams were forced to negotiate with the high draft choices.
The clubs were not in a position to deny representation to players
such as Joe Namath, John Mackey, and Ernie Davis. In fact, agents
were often sought by the new league to "convince" players to
accept contracts in the new league. This was accomplished by the
team or the AFL providing a percentage of the player's contract to
the agent as a bonus for convincing the player to sign with the
AFL team. The player paid ten percent to the agent, as did the
team. The agents did not bother telling the players about those
payments; that would just confuse the situation.
In 1966, the two leagues merged and, once again, players had
but one choice of where to play. Once again, the coach/general
manager could dictate terms and conditions of employment, and
the player could be denied counsel or the advice of an agent.
Players were angry about the merger, which eliminated any freedom of contract. Defensive back Bernie Parish contacted the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters to organize the players
into a union. Between the 1966 and 1967 seasons, Parish and the
Teamsters held meetings with the players to sign authorization
cards for the formation of the players union.
The NFL panicked at the thought of serious negotiations with
a real labor group and agreed instead to recognize the NFL Players Association (NFLPA). The NFLPA was to be the bargaining
agent of the players only if the players would agree not to affiliate
with the Teamsters. The NFLPA had been a sweetheart association for management during the AFL-NFL battles, but it would
now be transformed into a union, just to keep the Teamsters out.
One of the first items negotiated by the new "union" was the
right of players to be represented by an attorney of the player's
choice. This was a major breakthrough for the players-or so they
thought. By 1970, the NFL Players Association and the AFL Players Association merged into one union. The players demanded
and got the right for all players to have the person of their choice
as a representative in contract negotiations. No longer were negotiations limited to attorneys. The idea was that some players
might want a parent, an uncle, an accountant, or other adviser in
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the process, and there was no valid reason to limit representation
to attorneys.
This was, of course, a major mistake. Agents came from
everywhere to represent players. Former sports writers, ex-convicts, and n'er-do-wells from all walks of life sought to help players
with negotiations. Agents started visiting campuses to sign players. They hired former and even active players to act as their
salesmen with the college players at the Senior Bowl, East-West
Shrine game, and, eventually, on campus. Agents would give a
percentage of the contract money to the "runners" hired to lure
the unsuspecting players. In reality, the union inadvertently created a cottage industry for incompetent and unethical people
whose goal was a quick negotiation for an athlete.
By 1975, the NFLPA leadership realized that most of the
agents were incompetent, and decided to hold seminars to educate the agents.7 The leaders reasoned that they should at least
inform the agents about the nuances of the standard form contract, the bonus clauses, how to file injury grievances and workers
compensation claims, and give them the disability provisions of
the pension plan. Keep in mind that, at this time, the NFL was
still refusing to let the union see the individual contracts entered
into by NFL players.
Because the clubs knew all the salaries, but the players and
the union did not, there was a tremendous advantage for the clubs.
The general manager could say with a straight face, "You will be
the highest paid center in the league if you accept this contract."
The player had no way of checking whether he was the highest
paid center in the league. This played into the hands of unscrupulous agents who lied about the wonderful deals they negotiated.
They could say anything, and there was no way for the player to
check.
Most agents did not want to be educated by the union. They
simply wanted new techniques for signing up the unsuspecting
players. Soon, notorious agent, Mike Trope, and others took the
old practice of giving college players a new suit, a pair of shoes, a
free trip, or a wild party, to a new extreme.8 They started paying
the athletes big sums of money if they would sign an exclusive contract with the agent while they still had collegiate eligibility
remaining.
7. See E. GARVEY, AGENTS GAME: SELLING PLAYERS SHORT, at 8 (1984).
8. See Kirshenbaum, The Year the Heisman Trophy Went to a Pro, Sports Illustrated,
Oct. 22, 1984, at 21; Lieber, Extra Points,Sports Illustrated, Dec. 9, 1985 at 74.
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The agent would give the athlete up to $50,000 to sign a contract, keep it in a safety deposit box, and then, when the athlete
was drafted, the agent would get his money back. How? Very
simple. The agents knew that 98% of contracts in the NFL were
not guaranteed. In other words, a three-year contract is only valid
if the player is not fired or too injured to play. The teams liked it
that way. The clubs knew that the agent had paid money to the
athlete and needed to get the money back. They knew that the
agent did not want to wait until the player actually received the
money, so they made a deal, which was sometimes implicit and
sometimes explicit. The clubs would say, "You give us the multiyear, non-guaranteed contract, with much of the money deferred
for ten to twenty years, and we will give the player a signing bonus
from which you can be paid a percentage of the entire contract."
For example, the agent would say to the athlete, "I'll take
seven percent of your contract." The athletes thought that meant
seven percent of what the player actually received. Not so. The
agent would sign the player to a five-year contract and take a percentage of the entire contract. In addition, the agent received
money when the contract was signed, but the athlete might never
get any. Nice work if you can get it, goes the old song.
B.

THE PLAYERS UNION BEGAN TO GET THE UPPER HAND

When the NFLPA negotiated a collective bargaining agreement in 1977, they demanded that the league turn over all standard form contracts to the players association. The contract
information was published in a booklet and sent to all players. The
phones rang off the hook. Players were upset that their salary had
been published, but happy to see what everyone else in the league
was receiving. For the first time, there would be some honesty in
the negotiations. For the first time, the general manager could not
distort the offer and tell the player that he would be the highest
paid player. The player knew.
If some players were upset, the agents were furious. The
figures showed that, below the second round of the draft, all players in the league got virtually the same amount of money, no matter which team had drafted him.9 There was a secret wage scaleno real negotiations had ever occurred. If a player was selected in
the third round, he got the same amount whether he had an agent
9. See Signalsfrom the National FootballLeague Player'sAssociation, Fall 1977-78 (on
file at Sports Seminars, Inc.).
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or not, or whether he was drafted by one of the so-called cheap
teams like the Bears or by one of the so-called generous teams-like
the Raiders.
However, agents continued to get clients, continued to violate
NCAA rules, and continued to hire "runners" to find new clients.
The universities seemed oblivious to or unconcerned about the
scam and the exploitation of student-athletes. Other than threats
to kick agents off the campus, there were no efforts by the universities to protect the student-athletes from the agents. The universities failed to educate the student-athletes about whether in fact
they needed an agent, or, if they did need representation, where
the student-athlete could hire a competent professional committed to serve the interests of the student-athlete.
Once it became obvious that the agents had no real impact on
negotiations, the NFLPA attempted to regulate agents' fees and
conduct. The NFLPA began with the North American Soccer
League (NASL).1° The NLRB-recognized union established that
agents were, at best, only tolerated, and that there was no inherent right for an individual to have an agent when a certified union
existed. This meant that the union could eliminate agents by fiat;
if the union could keep agents out altogether, then the union
could obviously regulate them. The NASL reluctantly agreed that
the union could sit in on any negotiations, negate any individual
contract in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement, and
set standards for contracts that were negotiated."
The agents panicked. They saw the end of the scam. They
initiated a decertification effort against the NFL Players Association and argued that the players would be better off with an agent
"union."' 2 They argued that an agent would be assigned to every
player for negotiations. Fewer than fifty NFL players signed their
cards.
In the Major Indoor Soccer League, the agents formed their
own "union" and challenged the MISL Players Association's right
to represent players.' 3 The MISLPA argued that it would be an
impermissible conflict of interest for a union official to represent
10. Morio v. North Am. Soccer League, 632 F.2d 217 (2d. Cir. 1980).
11. See North American Soccer League, Collective Bargaining Agreement.
12. Mike Trope and Jerry Argovitz were the two leaders of the ill-fated effort. Veteran
players rejected the notion that agents would protect them in collective bargaining.
13. Major Indoor Soccer League, Nos. 5-RC-11987 & 5-RC-12001 NLRB (Nov. 15,
1983) (decision issued by Louis J. D'Amico, the Regional Director of the Fifth Region of the
National Labor Relations Board).
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individuals, and the NLRB regional director agreed. 14 The director ,told the agents, in no uncertain terms, to give up the idea of a
union or give up the idea of negotiating for the individuals. 15
Their "threat" was over.
The agents in the soccer case argued that their union was pernissible because Larry Fleisher in the NBA Players Association
and Alan Eagleson in the NHL Players Association did the same
thing the agents wanted to do. 16 No matter, said the director, it is
not permissible.' 7 Eventually that ruling helped convince the
NBA Players Association and the NHL Players Association to
change their organizations to eliminate that particular conflict of
interest.
Finally, in the 1982 strike season, the last item agreed to by
the NFL was that the union could regulate the agents, including
their fees.' The NFL agreed not to negotiate with an agent who
was not licensed by the union.' 9 Later, the NFLPA inexplicably
decided that their regulations would not apply to rookies. Ninetynine percent of the problems, of course, involve rookies. By the
time a player is a veteran up for negotiation, he has learned not to
hire an agent. Eight years later, the agent problem is worse, not
better.
C.

THE SOLUTION TO THE AGENT PROBLEM

1. Enable the Freshman Student Already Involved With an
Agent to "Come Clean, " Tell the Truth, and Remain
Eligible
Today, if a 16-year-old shows signs of being a future basketball
star, he is likely to be contacted by an unscrupulous agent. The
contact may begin by giving the student-athlete or his parents a
small amount of money. The consequence of accepting the money
is that the student-athlete is ineligible, unless the student-athlete is
able to keep the agreement secret by lying whenever asked
whether he has entered into such an agreement or received funds
from an agent.
Any agreement by a high school athlete is, under the laws of
all states, illegal, because it is entered into with a minor unable to
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
National Football League's 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Id.
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agree to a binding contract. Such a contract is clearly contrary to
public policy, and can be declared null and void. Only the NCAA
gives such an agreement validity-at least enough to deprive the
young person, victimized by an agent, of a college education,
unless the young person is willing to lie. Why not establish an
NCAA rule that rewards honesty; for example, "If you tell us, we
will assist you in voiding the deal and will give you an adequate
educational program, so that you can pursue your professional
career in an open, honest, and informed way."? Apparently the
NCAA Professional Sports Liaison Committee fears that "it would
send an improper message to prospects and would be difficult to
administer.""0 To contribute to the corruption of a young athlete
because to do otherwise would present administrative difficulties
seems to us indefensible. How is it an improper message if the
NCAA says that if some crook gives an underprivileged kid some
money, the crook will be deprived of the benefit of the deal? Who
are we protecting? The answer seems to us clear-we're protecting the crook and sacrificing the young athlete. If a coach gives a
high school student money to attend the coach's institution, the
NCAA punishes the coach and the institution but gives the student-athlete eligibility anywhere except at the guilty institution.
The rationale is that the fault lies with the coach, not the young
athlete corrupted by the coach. Is it consistent to say that payment by an unscrupulous agent is the fault of the young athlete
rather than the agent?
2. Develop an Adequate Group of Honest, Competent, and
Reasonably Priced Representatives
The authors of this article have been working to replace the
incompetent agents with competent professionals. Our premise is
simple. There is no magic formula for representing athletes, and
the lack of training and formal education of the agents who are
operating today proves the point. The only requirement in
becoming an agent is to have a client. There are no tests to take,
no background checks, no formal training. Thus, if we could
encourage competent practicing attorneys to get involved in the
representation of athletes, we would give the athletes the option
of hiring a person who has a law degree and ethical standards, and
who charges only a reasonable fee. Finally, we would train the
20. Letter from Rick Perko, NCAA Legislative Representative, to Frank Remington
(copy on file at the University of Wisconsin Law School).
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attorneys in the nuances of the standard form contracts, salary
levels, and other aspects of negotiations.
The University of Wisconsin Law School received a generous
grant from alumnus, Bruce Thomas, to promote ethics in the practice of law. The Law School Dean believed that efforts to train
attorneys to replace the unethical agents was a worthwhile use of
these funds, and Mr. Thomas agreed. Because of that support, the
University of Wisconsin Law School and Sports Seminars conducted the first Sports Law Institute in 1989. Fifty-five attorneys
attended, and nearly all passed the examination to become certified to represent the student-athlete. Sports Seminars took that
list and circulated it to the athletes on the campuses where it conducted seminars. In those seminars, Sports Seminars tries to
demonstrate why the athletes would be better off with a practicing
attorney.
In August of 1990, the second institute was held over a four
day period with an outstanding faculty. The Institute soon became
known as the premier seminar in the country for attorneys wishing to learn about sports law and representation of professional
athletes, coaches, and universities under NCAA investigation. The
125 attorneys who attended the 1990 Institute have their names
listed, along with the names of the 1989 graduates, in a booklet
that is now available to University Career Counselling Panels and
to student-athletes.
However, the University of Wisconsin Law School and Sports
Seminars soon found out 'that just having a group of trained professionals was not enough. While their trained professionals waited
for the athletes to walk into the law office seeking representation,
the unqualified agents were on the campus using every technique
known to aggressive sales personnel to sign the athletes. The
Sports Seminars staff soon learned that the key to the success of
their efforts is to convince the athletes that they have an option
other than agents offering him money, gifts, and false promises.
To accomplish this, Sports Seminars concluded that it was essential
to hold seminars for student-athletes to convince them that reasonable alternatives to the incompetent agent are available.
3. Education of Enrolled Student-Athletes
Institutions of higher learning ought to be willing to sponsor
educational programs to enable student-athletes to make informed
career decisions, including the selection of representatives for student-athletes with an interest in pursuing careers in professional
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athletics. Although this seems both sensible and realistically
achievable, it has not been easy to convince university personnel
of this fact. The NCAA Executive Director has been encouraging.
Many of the conference commissioners, especially Roy Kramer of
the Southeast Conference, have been supportive, and some athletic directors have instituted educational programs.2 ' But the
NCAA has decided that it cannot sponsor educational programs
for student-athletes. The conferences have said it is up to each
individual school, and many of the schools have responded by saying that they cannot afford an educational program, even though
the cost is a very modest one.
But there are encouraging signs. Coaches, who are closest to
the student-athletes, understand the problem and are most supportive of a program that will equip the student-athletes with the
information to make informed decisions about their future in professional athletics--decisions in which student-athletes are able to
weigh the value of a university degree and the value of a professional contract. There is also a need to equip students with the
information to select competent representatives (and to understand the danger of dishonest and incompetent agents).
All of the coaches in the Western Collegiate Hockey Association have asked for a program for their student-athletes, and in
most schools one has already been held. In football, coaches at Syracuse, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Ohio State, Minnesota, Iowa, and USC
have had seminars for their student-athletes. In basketball, University of Minnesota coach, Clem Haskins, has said, of a seminar
conducted in the fall of 1990, that it was extremely helpful in
equipping his student-athletes to make an adequately informed
decision about their professional future. In addition, a one-day
program has been conducted for the Southeastern Conference to
educate compliance officers and athletic department personnel
about the dangers that agents present to their student-athletes and
institutions.22
Student-athletes in attendance at each of those programs
were very interested. They listened to and understood the problem. They welcomed the opportunity to learn about alternatives.
The results of the five-year effort to educate student-athletes with
regard to their choices are beginning to show, as players and their
parents call for advice.
21. Sports Seminars, Inc., for example, has conducted programs for both the
Southeastern Conference and the Atlantic Coast Conference.
22. SEC Seminar conducted on January 31, 1991 in Birmingham, Alabama.
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What does an adequate educational program for student-athletes consist of? During the meetings with student-athletes, it is
explained that a wage scale exists in sports. To put it another way,
the wages are predictable for most athletes. It is true that some of
the first round players in all major sports might "break the bank,"
but, for the most part, the wages of the athletes can be predicted,
within a few thousand dollars. It is important that the athletes
understand this important fact, because the agents don't really do
much to help educate athletes.
For example, one can predict that wages in the NFL will
increase by approximately eight percent in 1991 over the 1990 salaries. The average salary for a second round player in 1989 was
$290,500.23 With an eight percent increase, the second round
average will be $313,740. The message to the athletes is simple:
Why would you pay an agent four or five percent of $313,740,
when you will get that much if you just walk in the door? Why not
tell the agent, "Look, I can get $313,740 on my own. I'll give you
five percent of anything you get over and above that amount." In
reality, ninety-nine percent of the agents will say "Good-bye."
They cannot make a living if they only get a percentage of what
they actually get for the athlete, so they try to con the athlete into
giving the agent a percentage of the entire package.
The minute athletes agree to give agents a percentage of their
contract, they encourage the agents to agree to long-term agreements, because they get a percentage of the entire agreement.
Most players are better off with short-term contracts. If the player
were to hire one of the attorneys trained by the University of Wisconsin Law School and Sports Seminars, he or she would pay an
hourly rate. In almost every situation imaginable, the athlete will
pay much less by the hour than by giving a percentage to an agent.
An example of this is that the agent for the second round
player who agrees to a five-year contract would get over $75,000.
If a practicing attorney charging $100 per hour had handled the
negotiations, he or she would have to spend 750 hours on the contract to be paid that amount. Those are billable hours. Law firms
expect six billable hours a day. At that rate, the player could have
the attorney for twenty-one weeks on a full-time basis to equal the
amount the agent received. And, if truth be known, the agent
probably spent five or ten hours in actual negotiation. In addition,
23. See Signals from the National Football League (copy on file at Sports Seminar, Inc.).
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they added very little to the money the athlete could have gotten
on their own.
As the University of Wisconsin Law School and Sports Seminars program gets into more Division I schools, the elimination of
the incompetent and unethical agents is a realistic goal. But success is likely only if college and university presidents, the NCAA,
conference commissioners, and directors of athletics join coaches
in their commitment to a program of educating athletes.
4. Getting the Informed Student-Athlete and the Qualified
Representative Together at the Appropriate Time
The honest and competent representative will not solicit business, especially when to do so would jeopardize the eligibility of
the student-athlete. Therefore, open and above-board ways need
to be developed, so that the student-athlete can meet and talk to
representatives and choose the best person to represent the student-athlete.
Again, the NCAA rules impede the achievement of qualified
representation. Present rules prohibit assistance by a competent
representative and, as a result, give a monopoly to the dishonest
agent. Commonly, student-athletes are contacted by the unscrupulous agent before eligibility is completed. This is done in secret.
It is particularly common in the sport of ice hockey, because of the
18-year-old draft. The following is an actual case illustration of
how solicitation happens today in the sport of ice hockey, and a
further illustration of how it could happen if the NCAA rules are
changed as they should be.
The Wrong Way. A junior player is contacted during his
period of eligibility by an unscrupulous agent. It is clear, in retrospect, that the player has had this agent for some time, perhaps
even prior to entering college (whether he has is not known
because, under NCAA rules, the student-athlete cannot admit to
such a relationship without losing eligibility). The agent tells the
student-athlete that a professional team is interested in his turning
professional immediately (this is not true). The agent then contacts the professional team, tells them that the student-athlete is
anxious to turn pro (this is also not true), and solicits an offer from
the team. The student-athlete signs, gives up a chance of
obtaining a degree, pays most of the signing bonus to the agent, is
assigned to the minor leagues, does not earn the amount of money
agreed to if he made the major league team, and is not heard of
again.
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The Right Way. The student-athlete should be asked, when
he enters college, whether he has an agreement with an agent. If
he does, the agreement should be voided and the student-athlete
told there will be open and above-board discussion of how to do it
the "right way." It is not wrong for a talented student-athlete who
is a junior, for example, to want to inquire about professional
opportunities. If he does, he should be helped by a competent
professional who will give priority to theinterest of the studentathlete. This can best be done by discussing the value of obtaining
a university degree by delaying a professional career on the one
hand, and giving up the degree and immediately turning pro on
the other hand. To make an informed decision, the student-athlete needs to know the value of each alternative. This can only be
accomplished with the help of a competent representative. If that
had been done in the illustrative case, it is likely that a decision
would have been made to stay in school. Alan Page, a former professional football great, has counseled that negotiating the most
favorable contract is possible only if the athlete has an alternative.24 The only alternative available to most athletes is to pursue
a career outside of athletics, an alternative which today requires
an undergraduate or even a graduate degree. In his successful
contract negotiation with the Chicago Bears late in his career,
Page had a law degree and was able to make clear to the Bears
management that he would remain in football only if their offer
was a generous one.
Once again, NCAA rules prevent sensible professional counseling from taking place. If the competent representative telephones the professional team to determine how favorable- a
contract the student-athlete will be offered, and does so in an open
and above-board way, the student-athlete is ineligible for continued participation.' Without that information, it is impossible for
the student-athlete to evaluate the alternatives available to him.
The result is that the crooked agent, who does not care about
the NCAA rules, is able to exploit the student-athlete, literally
ruining his life. The agent can sign the student-athlete before he
or she enters college, and everyone will keep quiet. He can
develop a phony deal when the student-athlete is a junior, and no
one will know, because it will be done in secret and in the way that
results in the maximum financial benefit to the agent. This is the
24. University of Minnesota seminar conducted in September, 1990.
25. BYLAw art. 12.3.2.1, NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 72.
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situation today, and, as a result, a lot of student-athletes are
exploited.
In fairness, the NCAA has an answer-the Career Counselling
Panels.26 The panels are to be made up of full-time members of
the university faculty. The panels may "[m]eet with the studentathlete and representatives of professional teams. 2 7 The difficulty
with these career counselling panels is threefold.
First, the panel members are, almost without exception,
unqualified to enter into negotiations, even preliminary negotiations, with a professional team.
Second, the panels seem to have a conflict of interest position,
because the interest of the university team is often different from
the interest of the student-athlete. One would expect that in universities that have a law school, a university panel would have at
least one member of the law school faculty. At a time when the
panels did not represent the student-athlete, the panels may have
been appropriate. However, a clear conflict of interest exists if the
NCAA provision, which states that the panel may "[m]eet with the
student-athlete and representative of professional teams,"8 means
that the panel is to represent the student-athlete in negotiations.
If the panel is not to serve in that capacity, then the student-athlete is left without the needed assistance of a representative committed to serve the student-athlete's interests.
Third, even if the panel members were able to commit themselves to serve only the interest of the student-athletes, it is almost
impossible to convince the student-athletes of that fact. The student-athlete will conclude that a panel made up of full-time university personnel will give priority to the interest of the university
and its team and not to the interests of the student-athletes, if the
two are in conflict. For these three reasons, existing faculty panels
have been largely ineffective.
However, the panels can serve a useful purpose, as has been
demonstrated by the Atlantic Coast Conference seminar conducted in March of 1991 at Duke. The panel can search out and
review the qualification of professionals who are willing, if asked,
to represent a student-athlete. The review can include: a consideration of the professional competence of the representative,
including, but not limited to, continuing education of a kind conducted by Sports Seminars; adherence to standards of professional
26. BYLAW art. 12.3.4, NCAA MANUAL supra note 1, at 72.
27. BYLAW art. 12.3.4(c), NCAA MANUAL supra note 1, at 72.
28. Id.
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responsibility to ensure that priority will be given by the representative to the interests of the student-athlete and not to the financial interests of the agent; and information about the method the
representative will use in determining the fee that will be charged
the student-athlete. After a list of the most qualified representatives is compiled, the panel can then arrange for on-campus interviews of the representatives by interested student-athletes. The
interested students can then choose that representative who
seems most qualified to serve the needs of the student-athlete and
provide competent, professional representation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Universities with major Division I programs in football, basketball, baseball, and ice hockey, spend a great deal of money to
interest young people in a particular sport and to recruit those
who demonstrate the highest degree of athletic ability. It is our
opinion that the only possible justification for universities to sponsor major athletic programs is that doing so contributes to the education of student-athletes and, in some cases, equips the students
to pursue a professional career in athletics. If the universities commit themselves to neither graduation nor a financially rewarding
professional athletic career, then what excuse is there for universities to continue to give emphasis to their athletic programs? Is it
to use the student-athletes for only so long as those student-athletes furnish entertainment, help alumni relations, or facilitate
fund raising?
Accepting the recommendations we make will cost universities money, and may, in some cases, adversely affect the win-loss
record of the team. Giving the student-athlete the education
needed to avoid unscrupulous agent costs money - a reason given
by some schools and conferences for not doing so. Requiring a
school to give financial assistance to former student-athletes to
help them obtain a degree will also cost money. A principal priority today of the Presidents' Commission of the NCAA is cost reduction, which makes it difficult to persuade schools to take on an
even relatively modest additional financial burden. Also, allowing
athletically gifted student-athletes to consult competent representatives, who will give priority to the interests of the studentathletes, may result in some student-athletes deciding that to leave
school early is in his best interest. This may have a negative effect
on the team's ability to win games.
The question is how much the educational integrity of an
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intercollegiate athletic program is worth. How much is it worth
for a university to be able to honestly say that it gives the highest
priority to the future of those students who participate in intercollegiate athletics at this school? Rodney Smith has stated what has
not been done:
[O]ne of the major problems with the governance of
intercollegiate athletics is that clear cut thoughtful articulation of the underlying values supporting big-time intercollegiate athletics, and the evaluation of the relationship
between those values and particular actions, is too often
nonexistent ....29
In our view, the value to which intercollegiate athletic programs should be committed includes the opportunity for all student-athletes to obtain an education, reflected at least in the
achievement of an undergraduate degree, and the opportunity of
the few who have outstanding athletic ability to pursue a career in
professional athletics without being victimized by an unscrupulous
agent. This opportunity includes the ability, should the occasion
arise, to make an informed choice between an education and a
degree on the one hand, and a career in professional athletics on
the other hand.
If this basic value is to be achieved, there is need for change.
The time for change is now.

29. Smith, An Academic Game Planfor Reforming Big-Time IntercollegiateAthletics,
67 DEN. U.L. REV. 213, 223 (1990). For a helpful discussion of the tension between the
interest of the university and the interests of the individual student-athlete, see Jennings
and Zioiko, Student-Athletes, Athlete Agents and Five Year Eligibility: An Environment of
Contractual Interference, Trade Restraint and High-Stake Payments, 66 U. DEr. L. REV.
179, 216 (1989).

